Effectiveness of government control: Evidence from the Comptroller General of the State of Ecuador
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.51915/ret.401Keywords:
Government Audit, supreme audit institutions, government control, administrative corruption, accountabilityAbstract
This article evaluates the effectiveness of the institutional control exercised by the Comptroller General of the State of Ecuador (CGE) in Ecuador between 2019 and 2023, as a supreme audit entity (SAI). Through a mixed methodology, 392 reports on compliance with recommendations, interviews with expert personnel in government auditing, and official data on the determination of responsibilities and collection values were analyzed. The results reveal a high formal compliance rate of 84%, but with a persistence of structural weaknesses in aspects such as supervision, contracting and document management, identifying patterns of institutional inefficiency. A significant gap is evident between the amount of determined responsibilities and what was collected, which indicates the limitations in the sanctioning capacity of this control body. It is concluded that to consolidate effectiveness, it is necessary to improve inter-institutional coordination, adopt audits with a preventive approach and redesign monitoring and sanction mechanisms.
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